




National Movements and Islamic Movements in Tartarstan
 by Eduard Ponarin1  
The revitalization of Islam in Tatarstan dates back to the time of perestroika in the late 1980s. It was a part 
of a more general process of searching for ideological alternatives, one that involved all peoples of the USSR. 
Islam was an important tool of the Tatar national movement that reinforced a distinct Tatar identity and de-
mands for greater autonomy or independence.
At that time, the most common approach was to restore Islam as a conservative national tradition, as a set of 
certain popular rites.  It was not yet an independent political force.  The nationalist movement used Muslim 
symbols, such as green ﬂags and traditional hats, instrumentally, to back up political demands with claims of
national authenticity. 
Some scholars draw direct parallels between the leaders of the national movement in the late 1980s and the 
so called “national communists” of the 1920s who had strategically used Communist rhetoric to legitimate 
their demands for greater autonomy for their peoples.  Likewise, the Islamic renaissance in the late 1980s 
was an important asset in the struggle to promote Tatarstan’s autonomy.  The instrumentalist role of Islam is 
exempliﬁed by numerous instances of its non-canonical use, for instance, reciting prayers in theaters, staging
theatrical shows devoted to Ramadan and the feast of Sacriﬁce in stadiums or in the streets near national
monuments.  The ﬁrst public celebration of Ramadan was in Kazan on April 16th, 1991. It culminated in a
procession of thousands of people to Freedom Square chanting the slogans of the national movement.  
Since the mid-1990s such public celebrations of religious holidays have become rare.  Celebrations have 
become more private and local.  The only public components left are the formal greetings published in the 
press on the occasion of a religious holiday.  The Russian-language newspapers of Tatarstan sometimes totally 
ignore them.  At the same time there a more self-sufﬁcient strand of Islam has emerged, one that is independ-
ent of either the remnants of the nationalist movement or the local government.  Moreover, it is this strand of 
Islam that has recently exhibited some political ambitions. 
As of 1990, there were only 154 Muslim parishes in Tatarstan (for about two million Tatars living there), most 
of them had formed after Gorbachev’s reforms. Of the 55 imams, 41 were older than 60 years of age, only one 
had university-level theological education and only eight had secondary (high-school level) Muslim education. 
1990 was a year of great changes.  In that year, for the ﬁrst time since the early 20th century, two Muslim
secondary schools appeared in Tatarstan.2   The creation of numerous new parishes and building of mosques 
continued at a high pace; the number of parishes increased from 18 in 1988 to more than 700 in 1992.  These 
changes were not controlled either by the government or the Spiritual Board of Muslims.  According to Valiulla 
Yakupov, the current deputy head of that body, “almost half the mosques [at the time] were built without any 
licensing documents from any Muslim authority”.  Foreign assistance coming from rich Muslim nations played 
an important role in ensuring these changes. 
In 1992 the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan was set up; previously, the Tatarstan Muslim organizations 
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were subordinated to the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European part of Russia and Siberia with headquar-
ters in the city of Ufa, Bashkortostan and headed by Talgat Tadjutdin.  Tatar nationalists played a substantial 
role in the process; they called on the Ufa mufti to relocate his headquarters to Kazan, the capital city of Tatar-
stan, because, according to them, the coming secession of Tatarstan from Russia would require independent 
religious structures. The mufti declined those calls and instead established an ofﬁce of his representative in
Kazan.  Eventually, the emergence of an alternative Muslim governing body precipitated a schism among the 
Muslims of Tatarstan.
The acrimony surrounding this split was indirectly related to the abolition of the Council on Religious Affairs 
in Moscow, the Russian government watchdog organization.  After its demise, the receipt and distribution of 
ﬁnancial assistance from foreign Muslim countries became uncontrolled.  The clerics of Tatarstan sought to tap
into the ﬁnancial ﬂows that went mostly to Ufa. On the 2nd International Islamic Forum “The Islamic Educa-
tion in East Europe and Muslim States” held in Moscow on September 28 – October 1, 1992, the leaders of the 
international Muslim organizations concluded agreements with the leaders of new Russian Muslim organiza-
tions.  These included agreements to provide ﬁnance, teachers, and receiving students at the Islamic univer-
sities abroad.  On the same forum, the Saudi representatives gave away ﬁfteen libraries of (mostly) Salaﬁte
(known as Wahhabite in Russia) literature.  According to Valliulla Yakupov, the Saudi delegations coming to 
Tatarstan hinted at generous assistance should an alternative organization to the Ufa Muslim headquarters 
emerge.  Disagreement among the Tatar clerics as to how these spoils should be divided greatly contributed 
to the heat and eventual split concerning the establishment of a Tatarstani Muslim Spiritual Board.  
The second principal factor in that schism was the position of President Shaimiev of Tatarstan.  By that time 
the Tatarstani leadership no longer saw the feeble federal center as a major threat to its power.  Even though 
Shaimiev supported the August 1991 coup, Yeltsin proved unable to remove him in the wake of his victory in 
Moscow.  The strong support rendered to Shaimiev by the Tatar nationalist movement made him impervious 
to the ire of the federal president.  Rather, Shaimiev saw the major threat to his power the popular national-
ist leaders who he deemed too popular.  Consequently, as soon as he had secured several privileges for his 
republic by concluding a very favorable treaty with Moscow in 1994, his policies with respect to the nationalist 
movement changed. He continued co-optation into his government of those nationalists who he deemed less 
dangerous and sought to marginalize those he felt he could not trust. Among the latter happened to be the 
most popular nationalist leader Fauziya Bairamova (elected the Tatar Woman of 1990), the chairman of the 
Ittifak party.  Soft repression against her and her associates included the closure of her party ofﬁce in Kazan
in 1995 and of the Altyn Urda newspaper in 1996.
President Shaimiev wanted to ensure political control over this continuing religious renaissance.  Once a local 
Muslim governing body had been established, Shaimiev chose to support it to the detriment of the Ufa mufti 
Talgat Tadjutdin. As the latter was based outside of his republic, Shaimiev could not fully control him.  At the 
same time Tadjutdin was very popular within Tatarstan (elected the Tatar Man of 1989) and thus potentially 
dangerous. Consequently, by 1995 the  schism among the Muslims of Tatarstan had been overcome by soft 
repression of those who remained loyal to Tadjutdin. This was accompanied by a campaign against Tadjutdin in 
the local press, including the government newspaper Watanym Tatarstan.  The seizure of mosques and other 
premises by the supporters of the new Tatarstani mufti followed.  In January 1995 a Congress of Tatarstani 
Muslims recognized the new status quo.      
It was not long before the head of the newly established religious body, ‘Abdulla ‘Aliulla, found out how far 
the republic’s leadership would tolerate independent political actors in Tatarstan.  His attempt to seize another 
mosque and a Muslim school in Kazan in the fall of 1995 resulted in a criminal case against him.  His leader-
ship position was shaken and, in February 1998, another cleric, ‘Usman Iskhakov (with support from Shaimiev) 
was elected the republic’s mufti. ‘Aliulla condemned the government interference and drew support from the 
opposition nationalist parties including Ittifak and Milli Mejlis.  According to him, the county-level government 
leaders handpicked delegates to the Congress of Tartarstani Muslims and instructed them on who they should 
support in the elections. 
Even before he was ousted, ‘Aliulla initiated a rapprochement with the opposition nationalist forces in order to 
strengthen his position within the republic.  In 1996 he became the head of the “Tatarstan Muslims” movement 
and later, in 1998, attempted to participate in the local elections as the leader of the Omet movement and a 
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gave no chance for any opposition leader to win elections in the republic.  At that time all heads of the county 
government had become members of the local legislature.  Tatarstan had turned into one of the least demo-
cratic regions of Russia.  In 1999, ‘Aliulla went on a hunger strike to demand a change to the electoral law of 
the republic.  Representatives of ﬁfteen opposition parties and movements, including Ittifak, Milli Mejlis, and
Omet, organized a demonstration in his support and against the authoritarian rule of Shaimiev.
In the meantime, ‘Usman Iskhakov consolidated his position of leadership, thanks to strong backing from the 
local government.  He appreciated how far his leadership depended on Shaimiev’s support.  As the Chairman 
of the Milli Mejlis party wrote, “[‘Usman Iskhakov] was and still is an obedient tool of the authorities.”  The 
domination of Shaimiev in religious matters is exempliﬁed by his personal choice of an imam for the newly
opened Kul Sharif grand mosque in Kazan in 2005.  The political loyalties enjoyed by the current mufti has 
helped him win a second re-election in February 2006, in spite of the rule against more than two consecutive 
elections and even though local nationalists, unleashed a vicious campaign against him on the eve of the elec-
tions.  Apparently, this loyalty has also allowed him to acquire a personal fortune of money, mainly from the 
various foreign charities that continue to send money to build up Islam in Tatarstan.
 
